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ABSTRACT 
This paper is a further development of the second section of 
Social Science Working Paper Number 410. I argue here that 
disagreements over how well or how ill someone has performed in some 
social role are affected by a widespread tendency to confuse public and 
private roles. Those who assess performance in a given role by the 
standards appropriate for private roles will never agree with those who 
assess the same performance by the standards appropriate for public 
roles. I illustrate this thesis by examining differing evaluations of 
a number of typical policy decisions. While I do not expect that this 
discussion will terminate all such disagreements, I hope it may help 
disputants to understand what it is they are disagreeing about. 
ROLES, ROLE MODULATIONS AND DIFFERENTIAL MORAL 
ASSESSMENT OF ROLE PERFORMANCE 
W. T. Jones 
Is it right to condemn the policy of the Johnson administration 
in Vietnam as ruthless? Was the Carter administration's policy in Iran 
during the occupation of the embassy weak and indecisive? Should 
Eisenhower have lied to Khrushchev about the U-2 overflights? Was 
Nixon's handling of the Watergate break-in immoral, or only 
incompetent? Assessment of role performance, difficult at best, is 
made more, and unnecessarily, problematic by a currently widespread 
tendency to conflate -- at least to slur over the difference between 
public and private roles. People who act, and expect others to act, in 
public roles as if these were private roles and people who act, and 
expect others to act in private roles as if these were public roles, 
will always disagree about what our duty is. 
This being the case, in this paper I shall first point up some 
of the differences between public and private roles and then show how 
choice is complicated, and moral disagreements are made more difficult 
to terminate, by the currently widespread tendency either to assimilate 
private roles to public ones, or public roles to private ones. I 
certainly do not believe that I can terminate all disagreements about 
role performance -- that would be optimistic indeed. But I do hope 
that the analysis that follows will help eliminate one complicating 
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factor that makes agreement more difficult to achieve than it need be. 
I 
It is easy to see that there are fundamental differences 
between public and private roles. if one thinks of ideal typical 
cases. l But most actual roles fall into a spectrum ranging from those 
that are fully private (e.g •• friend. lover). to those that. though 
still private, take on some of the aspects of public roles (husband, 
wife, parent, child. teacher. pupil). to those that are fully public 
(president of a corporation. air controller, chief petty officer). It 
is important to note, first. that the locus of a role on this spectrum 
the point on the spectrum at which a role is perceived to be located 
when it is well performed -- varies from time to time, and second, that 
the locus assigned to the role at any particular time varies with the 
varying perspectives of those making judgments about how roles ought to 
be played out. 
I shall begin by listing some of the features of obviously 
private roles -- that is. roles that "everybody" locates towards the 
private end of this spectrum. (1) The more private a private role is 
the less it looks like a role; it is rather a relationship that is 
personal and so unique. Thus the paradigmatically private role is that 
of lover or friend. rather than husband or wife. Lovers and friends do 
indeed have expectations of each other -- expectations that mayor may 
not be realized. However, the expectations of each pair of lovers, 
each pair of friends, are peculiar to this pair, not generalizable 
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across pairs, even in the same social class and the same culture. Each 
pair has its own flavor, its own tone, and its life is the living out 
of this flavor, this tone. This feature is especially marked in the 
kind of friendship Aristotle called the friendship of the good, in 
contrast to friendships of utility and of pleasure. 2 Though 
friendships of these latter kinds may also develop their own flavor, 
they are formed only because each party to the friendship expects to 
benefit from the relationship, and such friendships last only as long 
as these benefits are obtained. 3 
As for marriage, it is true of course that each married pair 
has expectations that are unique to that pair; each marriage has its 
own flavor, good or bad. To that extent marriage is a private role 
sustained less by recognized benefits obtained than by the individual 
perceptions the married pair have of each other. But marriage is also 
an institution sanctioned by the state and maintained by a consensus 
that defines society's expectations for marriage. To that extent 
marriage is a public role. 
Romantic marriages are marriages based chiefly or even 
exclusively on an experienced flavor; unless, in the course of time, 
benefits come to be exchanged, they endure only as long as the flavor 
lasts. When divorce is imminent we can see the private morality of 
such marriages turning into public morality. Commercial marriages are 
marriages of convenience. The morality of such marriages is public 
from the start, though they may, as time goes on, acquire a tone of 
their own and so move in the direction of private morality. 
People vary, and cultures vary, about where on the spectrum 
between private and public roles -- between romance and commerce 
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they think a good marriage is located. Jane Austen thought that purely 
romantic marriages were a disaster. Purely commercial marriages were 
hardly within her ken; we must go to Dickens or Thackerey or Trollope 
for an assessment of those -- Lizzie Greystock's marriage to Lord 
Eustace and Julia Brabazon's marriage to Lord Ongar were as disastrous, 
in Trollope's view, as any of the romantic elopements that offended 
Jane Austen's expectations for marriage. In this century -- indeed, in 
the last few decades -- there has been a very massive shift of the 
perceived locus of a "good" marriage, a shift toward the romantic, or 
private, end of the spectrum. The current view has moved so far that, 
as a result of a kind of perspective foreshortening, the kinds of 
marriage that nineteenth-century moralists held to be eminently sound 
are now lumped together with the kinds which they condemned as merely 
commercial. 
(2) Roles are private not only to the extent that the 
expectations in which they consist are individuated to the persons 
concerned but also to the extent that these expectations are less that 
such-and-such behaviors be forthcoming in such-and-such circumstances 
than that the behaviors, whatever they be, are expressive of the 
attitudes animating the actors in this relationship.4 Alternatively, 
we can say that a role is private to the extent that the behaviors in 
which the role consists are symbolic of the special flavor of this 
relationship, rather than recognized means to agreed-on ends. Gestures 
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-- facial expression. tone of voice. bodily movements -- are therefore 
important in private roles. and they are more important for the 
feelings they reveal than for the results they achieve. 
(3) Roles are private to the extent that they are not clearly 
specified. ex ante expectations that the role players explicitly accept 
on entering the role. Rather. private roles grow and develop over 
time. within very loose and unspecified parameters. And they do not 
end briskly. with a bang. when one role player finds the other not 
living up to his expectations. They fade away as the relationship 
loses its flavor. This characteristically happens when the gestures 
come to be perceived as dishonest. as no longer revelatory of real 
feelings. 
(4) Private roles are organic patterns. whose end is this 
pattern itself. rather than aggregations of components combined into 
this role only because they subserve the external goal that this 
aggregation is expected to achieve. 
(5) Private roles are essentially limited to face-to-face. one-
to-one relationships. A group (e.g •• of friends) will consist of a set 
of more or less overlapping dyadic relationships. Such a group may 
even have a structure. but it will be a loose, fluid, horizontal 
structure that results from the fact that every individual in the group 
stands in a dyadic relationship to several group members. 
So much for the leading features of private roles. Private 
morality has an undeniably great appeal -- an appeal so strong that 
many people treat all roles as private roles. That is. they view all 
social relations whatever as relations between private individuals: 
their expectations for the roles that I shall be characterizing as 
public are what they would be if these roles were private. 
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One of the best known versions of this view is contained in the 
sayings of Jesus as they are recorded in the New Testament. If we love 
God with all our hearts and our neighbor as ourselves we are not likely 
to go wrong in particular concrete situations. Rules prescribing 
correct interpersonal expectations are therefore not only not needed; 
they are positively a hindrance to living morally. It has sometimes 
been argued that Jesus' specific injunctions turn the other cheek, 
judge not, love your enemies -- are examples of an "interim morality"; 
they have been thought to reflect his belief that the end of the world 
was imminent. It is possible, however, that they reflect instead his 
sense that in private relationships the symbolic aspect of an action as 
revealing a state of mind is more important than its effect on the 
external state of affairs. Thus Jesus may have urged his followers to 
take no thought for the morrow, not because he believed they would have 
no time in which to calculate, but because he held calculation to be 
inappropriate in those human relationships that are based on love 
rather than on benefits to be received and given in return. S 
Presumably Jesus would have allowed that some human relations must be 
based on a calculus of benefits -- he did say that we are to render 
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's. But, save for this enigmatic 
remark, he ignored public morality; it was simply not worth thinking about. 
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Kant's Critique of Practical Reason is another locus classicus 
for private morality; indeed. his aim may be said to have been to 
convert Jesus' version of private morality into a formal theory. 
Unfortunately. private morality does not lend itself very readily to 
this kind of translation; in private morality it is the spirit that 
counts. not the architectonic. Thus Kant's absolutely universal. 
absolutely binding categorical imperatives are inappropriate in the 
domain of private morality. What matters to people engaged in living 
out some private role is that their partners' truth-telling or promise-
keeping is an expression of a loving heart. not a possibly reluctant 
response to the stern voice of duty. And categorical imperatives are 
equally irrelevant and impractical in the domain of public morality. 
What public morality requires are just those "hypothetical" imperatives 
which Kant rejected as having nothing whatsoever to do with morality as 
he conceived it. 
More illuminating of the essence of private morality than 
Kant's formal theory is an event in his old age. Very frail. almost 
senile. near to death. he tottered to his feet when his physician 
entered his room and refused to seat himself until the visitor had 
taken a chair. The physician protested; Kant replied. "The feeling for 
humanity has not yet left me.,,6 Kant was not then acting in response 
to some categorical imperative. He was making a symbolic gesture that 
expressed the passion of a feeling heart. 
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II 
If these are the leading features of very private roles, what 
are the contrasting features of very public roles? (1) Just as the 
more private a private role is the less it looks like a role, so the 
more public a public role is, the more it looks like -- in fact, is --
a role. The more, that is, it is a set of standard expectations fixed 
in advance for the role players, rather than created by them in the 
course of their mutual interactions. Thus the paradigmatically public 
role is a Weber ian slot in some large bureaucracy, defined in such a 
way that everybody who meets a certain level of competence can perform 
equally well in the role. Ideally, role players in public roles come 
and go unnoticed; arrivals and departures do not affect the execution 
of the role. This contrasts with private roles, where the individual 
performer not only makes a difference, but makes the whole difference. 
In a friendship of utility one's opposite number can be replaced, but 
an Aristotelian friendship of the good disintegrates with the 
disappearance of one of the friends. 
Of course, the ideal of the totally replaceable performer is 
never realized. In even the most routinized of roles -- e.g., 
execution of an assembly-line task or of the manual of arms --
performances vary a bit from individual performer to individual 
performer, as foremen and drill sergeants know to their sorrow. 
Further, the higher a slot is in any hierarchy of bureaucratically 
defined slots, the more that role, whilst remaining a public role, 
takes on some of the features of a private role. At the highest levels 
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-- president, prime minister, field marshall -- individual style makes 
a great difference. Think of Hoover and Roosevelt, Chamberlain and 
Churchill, MacArthur and Marshall. 
But however individualized the performance of a public role may 
be, the expectations for public roles are always spelled out for the 
performer in advance by a constitution, or by some other document such 
as the by-laws of a corporation (or in nonliterate societies by an oral 
consensus), and the ultimate measure of role playing is not style but 
how well the role player manages to fulfill those expectations. What 
one chiefly admires in the playing out of a role that one takes to be 
private is integrity; what one chiefly admires in the playing out of a 
role that one takes to be public is effectiveness. Similarly, 
attitudes toward poor performance characteristically differ: the 
penalties for poor performance in a public role are social sanctions 
disapproval, ostracism, fines, imprisonment; for poor performance in a 
private role, loss of love. 
(2) Public roles are less free than private roles in the sense 
that the performer of a public role has an obligation to the 
organization of which that role is a part to do the best for that 
organization that he can. Not that performers of private roles do not 
experience conflicts between the different private claims of husband, 
wife, child, parent. But in addition to such conflicts as these, 
performers of public roles experience, and have to resolve, conflicts 
between private claims as such and the public claim of their public 
role, whatever it is. 
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And not only is there an almost inevitable conflict between 
public claims as such and private claims as such; there will be 
conflicts stemming from the fact that organizations are often nested. a 
smaller inside of a larger, and that larger one inside of a still 
larger. If the interests of the nested organizations are not identical 
-- and they seldom are -- the performer of a public role in anyone of 
these nested organizations in some sense has a role in all the others. 
to all of which he owes a prima facie duty.7 Consider a U.S. Senator 
weighing his differential prima facie duties to his state. to the 
Senate itself. to the nation, and to the UN. not to mention his prima 
facie duty to his family. This greatly complicates life for performers 
of public roles, and is sometimes felt as a heavy burden, so heavy that 
many people seek to avoid it. either by opting out of public roles so 
far as possible or else by treating their public roles as if they did 
not differ in any way from private ones. 
(3) Public roles are impersonal in a sense that is well 
represented by the way two bureaucrats may negotiate by an exchange of 
correspondence, a procedure that reduces the chance that idiosyncracies 
of style or personality differences might affect the outcome in 
unpredictable ways, i.e •• ways that defeat the expectations for the 
roles. Impersonality characterizes performance not only at lower level 
in an organizational hierarchy, but at least to some extent at the 
highest levels of public roles, where, as we have seen, some 
idiosyncratic role playing is expected. A president negotiating with a 
prime minister certainly takes account of that individual's personality 
traits, but he does so to gain a tactical advantage, not in order the 
better to express his love of his opposite number. 
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Thus we judge the interactions of people whom we think of as 
performing public roles by standards that are very different from those 
we apply to the interactions of people we think of as performing 
private roles, condemning in the one precisely those modes of 
negotiation which we approve in the other. Certainly spouses negotiate 
with one another on occasion, and so do friends and lovers. But when 
they do, it is not a matter of one member of the dyad trying to 
outmaneuvre the other to advance his own interest at the other's 
expense, but of seeking an arrangement that promotes the good of the 
dyad. Otherwise, we feel their relation is out of tune, if not 
positively harsh. An arms-length calculating stance is inappropriate 
for husbands and wives, friends and lovers, and other performers in 
private roles. 
(4) Public roles are impersonal in still another way. The 
ideal-typical performer of a public role allocates rewards and 
punishments, promotions and demotions, in strict accordance with 
criteria that are applicable across the board, uninfluenced by his 
personal feelings, whether favorable or hostile, toward the persons 
concerned. This way of behaving is inappropriate in private roles and 
is rightly condemned there. In private roles it is right that love, 
concern, and pity, as much as merit and demerit, determine how rewards 
are distributed, and often right, too, that deserved penalties be 
foregone. Conduct that would be called "favoritism" or "nepotismll 
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pejorative terms these -- in public roles is approved in private roles. 
(5) Public roles are designed; private roles grow. Further, 
public roles are designed with a view to the maintenance and 
improvement of the organization in which these roles are intended to 
function. Performance in a public role is therefore judged by the 
extent to which that performance contributes to the goals of the 
organization in question. The motives and attitudes of a performer of 
a public role are therefore largely irrelevant, except so far as they 
affect his ability to perform well in the role. 
At the lower levels in any organization janitor, aircraft 
maintenance man, assembly line worker -- roles are defined in great 
detail. What is expected of performers in such roles -- what they 
ought to do -- is to carry out the prescribed behaviors punctiliously: 
theirs not to reason why, theirs to get on with the job. At the upper 
levels of an organization -- corporation president, chief of staff --
where only the goals are defined (and then only in very broad terms) 
and the means are left largely open, what is expected of the performer 
is sound decision, i.e., correct cost/benefit calculation. 
This is the basis for appeals to raison d'etat, a phrase that 
has a bad name because unscrupulous rulers have so often used it to 
justify purely selfish conduct. But misuse should not discredit a 
practice that all office holders have always adopted. Lord Grey, the 
Whig prime minister who steered the Reform Bill successfully through 
Parliament, was only being more frank than most politicians when he 
remarked. IINo one admires the grand principles of morality more than I 
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do, but great nations cannot be guided by these rules." Grey could 
just as well have been speaking of the managers of any large 
organizations; there is nothing especially distinctive about great 
states. What he meant by "the grand principles of morality" was 
presumably something like the Kantian categoricsl imperatives. He was 
saying that a prime minister cannot afford the luxury of never telling 
a lie, never breaking a promise. He has to do the best he knows how to 
do for his country. 
In describing the characteristics of public roles in this 
section and those of private roles in the last section, I have 
deliberately taken extreme cases -- very private roles, very public 
roles -- in order to bring out some important differences. It remains 
to repeat what I said at the outset, that since most actual roles have 
some features that are private and others that are public, roles may be 
thought of as lying at varying points on a spectrum ranging from those 
at one end that are fully private to those at the other end, that are 
fully public. The role of chairman of a small department in a liberal 
arts college is a public role, but it has fewer public features than 
the role of chairman of a large department in a great research 
university. Or consider the role of investment manager. To make an 
investment decision regarding one's own portfolio is to perform in a 
private role, though it is more like performing in a public role than 
is making a proposal for marriage. But participating as a trustee in 
investment decisions regarding a university's portfolio is performing 
in a public role. Thus there would be nothing inconsistent or 
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irrational in an individual's behavior if he were to sell his own stock 
in companies doing business in South Africa and yet vote as a trustee 
to retain the stock of those same companies held in the university's 
portfol io. 8 
III 
A social order is possible only if most people most of the time 
pretty much know what their social roles -- whether public or private, 
or partly public and partly private -- require of them and if they by 
and large act as they are expected to act in these roles. There are in 
all societies at all times powerful forces promoting internalization: 
public opinion communicated in sermons and editorials and by a thousand 
other means; regulations promulgated by various professional 
organizations -- bar associations, medical associations and the like; 
procedural rules formulated for an organization's employees by its 
management; the decisions of courts backed by legal sanctions. When 
all these voices are unanimous and for certain ranges of behavior 
they practically are -- how is it possible for an agent to view his 
situation as morally problematic? 
(1) An individual can perfectly well know what is expected of 
him (and what he expects of himself) as a role performer in such-and-
such circumstances, and yet act otherwise because what he perceives to 
be his duty conflicts with what he feels as a strong interest. St. Paul's 
lament -- "I can will but cannot do what is right. I do not do the 
good things that I want to do; I do the wrong things that I do not want 
to do. • • • What a wretched man I aml" 9 -- is not often heard 
nowadays, sin having been secularized into psychosis, but the form of 
the conflict has not changed. 
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Apart from problems of this kind, resulting from what is 
sometimes called ''weakness of will, II moral problems are cognitive in 
nature. The typical moral problem is not to bring oneself to do what 
one knows one ought to do but to come to see what one ought to do. In 
what sorts of circumstances, at what sorts of decision points, is 
behavior morally problematic? 
(2) The agent may not know which of two or more well defined 
social roles is appropriate in the circumstances in which he finds 
himself. Roger of Mortemer must have known pretty well what was 
expected" of him as a trusted vassal of William the Bastard, Duke of 
Normandy; he must have also known what was expected of him as a vassal 
of Ralph of Crepy, Count of Amiens. Though his obligations to these 
'two lords did not necessarily conflict, they chanced to collide at the 
battle of Mortemer in 1054, when Roger, who was a general in William's 
army, took Ralph, who was serving in the French army, prisoner. What 
to do? He sheltered Ralph for three days and then returned him to the 
French side. lO 
This probably appeared to Roger as a conflict between the 
expectations of two private roles. In modern times roles of this kind 
have been shifted to the public domain (as with the conflict 
experienced by Robert E. Lee and other officers in the U.S. Army 
between their duty to their state and their duty to the United States). 
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A more typical example, from today's perspective, of a conflict between 
private roles would therefore be the problem a woman might experience 
in balancing the claims of her mother and of her daughter. Conflicts 
are also possible between a public role and a private role. For 
instance, when a friend is being considered for tenure, one knows what 
is expected of one as a member of then tenure review committee; one 
also knows what is expected of one as a friend -- at least one knows 
what this friend expects of one, for he has taken care to make it 
plain. One's problem, if one believes the friend to be unqualified, is 
whether to act in one's role as friend or in one's role as faculty member. 
These are all conflicts between two prima facie duties --
duties generated by the different expectations of the two roles. 
Before one knows what one ought to do one has to decide which of these 
two prima facie duties has the stronger claim. Alternatively, one may 
modulate one or both of the two conflicting prima facie duties in such 
a way that one can partially satisfy both claims. This, clearly, is 
what Roger sought to do when he sheltered Ralph. And if this 
modulation of feudal duty took on, i.e •• became a generally accepted 
practice, future vassals would know what they ought to do at precisely 
the point at which deciding what to do had been a moral problem for 
Roger. Since the role as modulated would now provide firm guidance, 
only weakness of will would be a possible problem. Thus roles are 
never static for long. Sooner or later they undergo modulations --
often small, sometimes large -- as some innovator's solution to a moral 
problem comes to be generally accepted. 
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(3) It is well know that the behaviors prescribed as "good" or 
"correct" in some role are never completely specified. There is always 
some tolerance -- even in a role as precisely laid down as the manual 
of arms -- for variation in performance, and often the tolerances are 
wide. As long as the tolerances, wide or narrow, are generally agreed 
on, the individual role performer does not face a morally problematic 
situation. But as circumstances change, disagreements may develop about 
whether such-and-such a behavior lies within or falls outside the range 
of acceptable variations. 
When this happens the behavior in question lies in what I shall 
call a vagueness band. Behavior in a vagueness band is quite different 
from behavior within an accepted range of variation -- different 
precisely because there is no agreement about whether the behavior in 
the vagueness band is good or bad, whereas all of the tolerated 
diversity is acceptable. if not equally good. Thus, upper middle class 
American parents used to know what was expected of them regarding the 
protection of their teenage daughters from sexual adventures. The hour 
at which the daughter should be at home and in bed on Saturday nights 
might vary -- there was a range of tolerated diversity; there must be a 
chaperone at dances -- but again there was a range of tolerated 
diversity regarding the qualifications of an acceptable chaperone. But 
parents who allowed very late hours or who were indifferent to the 
matter of chaperonage were, there was general agreement, performing 
badly as parents. Society knew they were bad parents, and they 
themselves knew it; even their teenage daughters knew it. Now, and for 
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some time, the policy of protection, and indeed, the whole role of 
parents, is in a vagueness band. Parents no longer know what society 
expects of them, or what they expect of themselves, as parents. 
In such cases, where the behavioral alternatives one is 
considering -- the options before one -- lie in a vagueness band, the 
band exists because, just at this point, society is not speaking 
unanimously but with several, perhaps many, different voices. 
Unfortunately for those who are made anxious by uncertainty, especially 
by moral uncertainty, there are vagueness bands in many roles, 
especially in periods of rapid social change. 
An individual in such a situation, whether he be anxious or 
not, wants to remove the present case from the vagueness band in which 
it now lodges. One may take the easy way out, which is to do 
punctiliously what the role called for in the past, when there was 
still general agreement about the expectations of the role -- this may 
be termed the pharisaical solution. Or one may just possibly want to 
take a closer look. To take a closer look is to examine the fit of the 
various modulations of the role that are being proposed. Each proposed 
modulation calls one's attention to similarities between the ambiguous, 
problematic case in which the agent now has to decide how to act and 
other clear-cut, obvious cases in which the role still provides firm 
guidance. But unfortunately, since different proposed modulations call 
attention to different clear-cut cases, the problem is to decide which 
of the similarities is most similar. If, over time, agents in the 
vagueness band come to adopt the same modulation, the role will have 
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been changed at this point, and what was morally problematic will have 
become, at least for a time, morally routine. 
But (4) the agent may perceive his difficulty neither as a 
conflict between two social roles in both of which he is a possible 
performer nor yet as a vagueness band in which he looks for, and fails 
to find, firm guidance. Rather, he may perceive it as a conflict 
between one of his social roles and what he takes to be an unqualified 
duty, i.e., a duty not attached to, not growing out of, any social 
role. An example might be a conflict between an unqualified duty to 
preserve human life and some role into which one has been cast (service 
in the army for a draftee) or for which one has deliberately opted 
(judge, surgeon). 
There is no vagueness band here, the agent may feel. He simply 
has to choose between a clearly understood duty and the clearly spelled 
out requirements for some particular role. Type (4) moral problems, on 
this view of the matter, are not cognitive problems resulting from 
uncertainty about what one ought to do in these circumstances; they 
are, like type 0) problems, matters of ''weakness of will, II where role 
requirement has replaced interest as the challenger of duty. 
But unless one is a Kantian, or some other variety of moral 
purist, one is unlikely to hold that so-called unqualified duties are 
absolutely unqualified. Ordinary people recognize that all duties are 
context-relative. People who would not think of lying in one social 
context lie freely in another, and without experiencing moral qualms 
when they do. But to say that truth-telling and promise-keeping are 
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context-relative is to say that people commonly take into account the 
specific social role they happen to be performing at the time they find 
they have to choose between lying and telling the truth. 
Hence to describe promise-keeping or truth-telling as 
unqualified duties is an unfortunate way of calling attention to an 
important feature of these behaviors. It is a misleading way of saying 
that a strong case has to be made before allowing lying to be a part of 
any social role and that the conditions under which it is permissible 
have to be carefully specified. The onus probandi. as it were. lies on 
any social role's claim to incorporate lying at some point. 
Putting the matter in this way does not mean that an agent 
say. a surgeon confronted with a choice between saving a fetus or 
destroying it -- may not face a real moral problem. But it is not the 
problem of choosing between an unqualified duty ("always preserve human 
life") and a role (surgeon). It is the problem of deciding whether to 
modulate the role of surgeon to take account of new insights about. 
say. a pregnant woman's rights, so that this role would permit, or even 
require, a performer on occasion to take a human life (a fetus that is 
grossly malformed? a fetus that is the outcome of a rape?). This way 
of putting the matter brings out the basic similarity between type (4) 
cases and types (2) and (3). Just as Roger of Mortemer wanted to 
modulate the role of vassal so as to allow vassals to perform their 
feudal obligations to two overlords, so a morally sensitive surgeon may 
want to modulate the role requirements so as to take account of the 
newly discovered rights of pregnant women. 
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Thus it is that moral problems arise because of some 
perceived failure of fit between an established role and the social 
circumstances in which the role is intended to be performed. This 
failure of fit may result either from changes in those circumstances 
since the role was established or from observation of some feature of 
the circumstances that was previously overlooked. Moral problems, once 
they emerge, are dissolved by a more or less extensive modulation of 
the role to produce a fit between it and the circumstances as they are 
now perceived to be. 
IV 
Role playing and making moral choices are -- to use a currently 
fashionable term -- dialectically related. Roles are constantly being 
modulated by individual moral choices made in vagueness bands; 
modulations, as they became more and more widely accepted, constantly 
. enter the culture as new roles which, by eliminating vagueness bands 
reduce the number of occasions where moral choices must be made. Not 
all modulations succeed, of course. A modulation may disappear as soon 
as it is introduced -- the introducer himself may not like the look of 
it when he sees it in action, or he may retreat from the hostility of 
moral conservatives who hold, with the Harry Claverings of every 
generation in every society, that "No man has a right to be peculiar. 
Every man is bound to accept such usage as is customary in the world." ll 
Modulations that are important for one society will of course 
be trivial for another, but for the moment let us focus on the capacity 
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to notice small differences -- differences which others, with less 
sensitive antennae, have overlooked but which, once noticed, are 
recognized to be important. Emma Woodhouse was one who had successfully 
internalized the role expectations for an early nineteenth-century 
English gentlewoman; she perceived herself as -- indeed, she ~ -- a 
lady. When she poked rather cruel fun at poor, defenseless Miss Bates, 
Mr. Knightley, whose antennae were much more sensitive than Emma~s, 
pointed out to her the disparity between the role of lady and her 
behavior on this occasion: "I cannot see you acting wrong, without a 
remonstrance. How could you be so unfeeling to Miss Bates? How could 
you be so insolent in your wit to a woman of her character, age, and 
situation? -- Emma, I had not thought it possible." Though Emma "tried 
to laugh it off, ••• she was most forcibly struck. The truth of his 
representation there was no denying. She felt it at her heart.,,12 The 
result was a very considerable modulation of Emma~s performance in the 
role of a lady; and young lady readers of the novel might -- who knows? 
-- incorporate this fictional modulation in their real-life behavior 
toward the real-life Miss Bateses of their acquaintance. 
Today such a modulation 8S this, and the differentiations in 
the environment to which it was responsive will be viewed 8S trivial. 
I have chosen it precisely because it seems trivial -- to reinforce the 
point that there is no difference between the ways in which trivial and 
important modulations are introduced, and no difference in the ways in 
which they become established, if indeed they become established. 
Modulations that take on do so because they call people~s attention to 
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aspects of the situation that, now that they attend to them, seem to 
them to be relevant. These modulations become a part of the culture 
and are now defended as correct usage by all the Harry Claverings who, 
earlier, had condemned them as deviations. 
It took no more than self-assurance for Mr. Knightley to 
correct Emma. Modulators who propose large-scale modulations 
Beecher and his fellow abolitionists, for example -- need courage as 
well, and a strong sense of rectitude. This is often, but not 
necessarily, supported by religious belief -- the Quakers' inner light 
is a case in point. In any event, proposers of large-scale modulations 
characteristically have more confidence in their judgment than a 
careful survey of the available evidence would warrant. But for them 
of course, it isn't a matter of judgment or evidence. People put 
forward such large modulations as abolition of slavery, not because 
they have made a calculation of costs and benefits (though they may use 
such an argument ex post to justify the modulation), but because they 
feel deeply about it. 
Role modulators of this type -- Beecher, Martin Luther King 
are to be distinguished from politicians -- Lincoln, Johnson -- who may 
preside over, and even participate in, the modulation of some role. 
Politicians characteristically respond to the pressure of events, 
including the pressure exerted by modulators; they do not actively 
advocate a modulation well in advance of a substantial movement in its 
favor. They are not risk-takers in the same sense that modulators are 
risk-takers, and modulators who acquire public office are likely at the 
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same time to acquire caution. 
Generally speaking, then, those whose natural response to a 
situation calling for a decision is to calculate, are unlikely to be 
modulators, nor are they likely to be among the earliest adoptors of a 
modulation proposed by others. For in its early stages a new 
modulation will almost always look cost-inefficient. By the same 
token, modulators and early adopters are likely to be amongst those who 
assimilate all roles towards private ones. The result of this 
assimilation is that they minimize the contribution roles make to the 
survival of the social fabric and so are more ready to risk large 
modulations than others would be. 
Finally, modulators are often admired in the abstract and at a 
distance. It is generally recognized that a society in which there 
were, literally, no modulations at all would be an absolutely static 
society -- not a human society at all. Hence the social utility of 
modulators is widely acknowledged. But what one wants is modulations 
that are occurring somewhere else, at some other time. Individual 
modulators, when they are close enough to have to be dealt with 
directly, are usually heartily disliked, for the obvious reason that 
one has to decide whether to accept the modulation they have proposed 
or to reject it. And most people find most modulators, again seen 
close-up, to be obsessive, intolerant, impatient, demanding -- in a 
word, "difficult." 
If large-scale modulations are usually launched by individuals 
of the kind just described, these modulations, somewhere along the road 
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to becoming established roles, are likely to be reinforced by the 
sanctions of courts and self-regulating bodies -- institutions for 
which, ironically, the modulator himself feels nothing but contempt, 
precisely because of the public nature of the roles associated with 
them. But no such sanctions are likely to be introduced -- still less 
to be sustained -- unless they are based on substantial, spontaneous 
consensuses. Thus the key element in moral change is always a risk-
taking decision by some morally sensitive individual, who, having 
detected a failure of fit between an existing role expectation and the 
situation in which he now has to act, modulates the role accordingly.13 
The spread of a modulation through a society, prior to its modification 
in institutional and legal forms, is quite like the spread of an 
esthetic innovation -- a new style in art or in music. If the 
modulation, whether moral or esthetic, takes on, we may be sure that it 
has brought into focus some aspect of people's experiential field that 
is important to them and that was missed in the earlier, unmodulated 
formulation. 
Thus living morally -- that is, living well -- depends on 
learning to adjust roles to each other and role expectations to 
changing circumstances as we come to see their relevance or as they are 
shown to us by others. Here, if Aristotle did not say it all, as usual 
he said most of it: 
Anyone can get angry -- that is easy -- or give or spend money; 
but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the 
right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is 
not • easy • to determine by reasoning • • • ; such things 
depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with 
perception. 14 
v 
Although roles are constantly being modulated, at any given 
time roles are arrayed in an order from those perceived, at that time, 
to be most public in character to those perceived to be most private in 
character. About performance in very private roles and in very public 
roles there is usually little disagreement. People know within broad 
limits what is expected of performers in such roles; they know what 
good role performance is. About roles in mid-range positions on the 
roles-spectrum there is likely to be more disagreement. Since. as we 
have already pointed out, mid-range roles have features that are 
private and also features that are public -- that is why they are mid-
range -- some people will focus on the private features and some on the 
public features. Those who focus on the private features of the role 
in effect shift the role down toward the private end of the spectrum 
and evaluate performance in that role by criteria appropriate for 
private roles. Those who focus on the public features of that same 
role make a corresponding shift in the opposite direction and evaluate 
the same performance by the very different criteria for public roles. 
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But that is not all. Not only does the locus of a particular 
role shift from time to time. as the role is shifted toward the public 
end or toward the private end of the spectrum. It seems also to be the 
case that on occasion the spectrum shifts as a whole. either toward the 
public or toward the private end. Such a shift in perspective can be 
thought of as a directionality common to all. or to most. of the many 
different specific modulations being recommended at any given time for 
many different roles. 
Why is it that at certain times the directionality of role 
modulations shifts in this way? To begin with. it appears to be the 
case that people differ temperamentally -- "attitudinally" might be a 
better word -- and that these difference in temperament or attitude 
affect the way they look at social roles and so their moral assessment 
of performance in these roles. 
Some people. that is to say. feel comfortable only in 
·relatively well-defined relationships with others (they like to "know 
where they stand"). Loose and fluid relationships not only seem to 
them to be wasteful and inefficient; such relationships generate a 
considerable amount of cognitive dissonance. Such people prefer to 
maintain a distance -- psychic and even physical -- from the people 
with whom they interact; actio ad distans is their motto. Further. 
they like to organize problems systematically, dividing them into their 
components and dealing with each of these in turn. Other people, in 
contrast, feel comfortable only in informal relationships. Situations 
that the first group find congenial, are felt by these people to be 
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stiff, empty, and "unnatural." So far from preferring to tackle a 
problematic situation from outside, these people want to know how it 
looks to those with whom they are interacting. Empathy, not 
observation, seemS to them the route to success in interpersonal 
relations, and calculation if detected or even suspected puts them off. 
Clearly, the first sort of temperament performs best in public 
roles; the second, in private roles. And when people with the first 
sort of temperament find themselves in private roles they are likely to 
perform in these roles as if they were public for instance, they may 
adopt an arms-length attitude toward a spouse or a child, treating 
him/her almost as they would business rivals. And the second group, 
who perform best in private roles, are likely to make an identical 
shift, but in the opposite direction, assuming that they can have the 
same easy relationship with their employees that they have with an old 
college chum. 
The conditions of contemporary life, playing on these 
differences in temperament and exaggerating them, have resulted in 
strongly bipolarized perceptions of many roles. In the later 
nineteenth century and during most of this century there was a gradual 
assimilation of most roles, save only the most private of private 
roles, to the public end of the spectrum -- a shift in direction that 
probably reflected such social developments as large-scale 
organizations, bureaucracy, mass-production, urbanization, and the 
disappearance of the squirearchy. In any event it is certainly the 
case that more and more roles became externalized. An example is the 
role of physician, which was once largely private (the Victorian 
physician who helped his dying patient across the threshold and 
supported the survivors in their grief is no fiction), and has now 
become largely depersonalized, more public than many public roles. 
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In a substantial part of the population this perspective on 
roles survives largely intact. But beginning at least as early as the 
thirties, a movement in the opposite direction can be noted. One sign 
of this was the widespread appeal of Sartre's emphasis on "good faith" 
as the only moral relationship between people, for good faith, as 
Sartre understood it, is possible only in the most intimate 
relationships. Sartre's mordant description, in Nausea, of the 
portraits in the Bouville museum is in effect a wholesale condemnation 
of performers in public roles: they are, one and all, inevitably in 
bad faith. 
And as the years have past, partly in reaction to what is 
perceived by some as excessive externalization. partly as a part of 
that change in ethos associated with Vietnam protest, flower children, 
Zen, drug culture, and hippy-dropout, more and more people have shifted 
the whole spectrum of roles sharply toward the private end of the 
spectrum, personalizing roles that were formerly regarded as public: 
corporation executives go to great pains to be liked by their 
employees, parents want to be friends with their children, and deans 
would not think of imposing fines on student offenders. 
When role expectations are strongly bipolarized, sharp 
disagreements about role performance are inevitable. Those who view a 
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particular role as public apply public criteria to the evaluation of 
performance in that role, while others, viewing that same role as 
private, apply private criteria to it. Thus evaluations of McNamara's 
performance as Secretary of Defense vary widely depending on which of 
these two views one adopts. From the former perspective one sees area 
bombing in Vietnam and the wholesale uprooting of villagers a 
distasteful but necessary job well done -- one praises McNamara for his 
competence. From the latter perspective one sees only the appalling 
human suffering and so condemns McNamara. "Professional" changes into 
"ruthless" as the perspective shifts. 
Was Carter sentimental in subordinating U.S. policy in the 
Middle East to the safety of 52 hostages? Or was he a noble 
humanitarian? Those who selectively attend to the public features of 
public roles are likely to emphasize the risks Carter ran for the sake 
of the hostages -- what was at stake, they point out, was not merely 
the lives of those 52 individuals but the thousands of lives that would 
be lost in a general war. In contrast. those who tend to assimilate 
public roles to private ones, will praise Carter for "caring" -- as one 
praises a parent for unselfishly succoring his defenseless children. 
Those who take this later view of Carter's performance in the hostage 
crisis are likely to evaluate his long support of Bert Lance more 
sympathetically than those who, viewing the role of president as 
strongly public, point out that this support seriously damaged Carter's 
ability to govern. 
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Again, though Nixon's handling of the Watergate case is almost 
universally condemned, the grounds for condemnation differ widely. 
Condemnation expressed in such language as "betrayal of trust," 
"dishonesty," "lack of integrity" reveals a tendency to assimilate 
public roles -- in the case the role of president -- to private roles; 
the underlying model is that of the close associate -- spouse, lover, 
friend -- who has let the other member of a dyad down. Contrast 
condemnation expressed in such terms as "initial blunder" and "repeated 
miscalculations" -- those who use such language expect a president to 
stretch the law a bit if that seems to him the only way to assure his 
reelection; that, these people, think, is a part of the role as it is 
usually played. What they are criticizing is incompetent performance 
in the role. 
Was Henry L. Stimson naive when, on learning that the mail of 
foreign ambassadors in Washington was being opened, he commented 
disdainfully, "Gentlemen don't open other gentlemen's mail"7 15 Clearly 
Stimson did not distinguish relations among people in their private 
capacity from their relations as officials. How people today react to 
Stimson's reaction depends on whether and to what extent they too 
assimilate public roles to private ones. 
Or compare Eisenhower's lie to Khrushchev about the U-2 
overflights and the lie he may have told Mamie, supposing he had 
anything to lie about, regarding his relation with Kay Summers by. 
People who strongly assimilate public roles to private ones are likely 
to regard both lies as blameworthy. Others those who strongly 
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assimilate private roles to public ones -- may agree that there is no 
difference between the two lies but argue tbat this is the case because 
the latter is as justified as the former. Doubtlessly, they will say, 
Eisenhower should not have allowed himself to be maneuvered into the 
position where he had to lie. But the only relevant question about 
lies to Khrushchev or to Mamie was whether, in the awkward 
circumstances in which he found himself, a lie exposed would do more 
damage than the truth admitted. What is called for in all cases is a 
calculation of comparative costs. 
Still others -- those who distinguish between public and 
private roles -- will distinguish between the two lies. They will 
argue that the lie to Khrushchev was justified. It is, they would say, 
just the sort of case in which raison d'etat operates, whereas the 
calculations that are appropriate in deciding how to act in public 
roles are unseemly in the relations between a husband and a wife. A 
lie to Mamie, had he indeed lied to her, would have been wrong even if 
he hoped thereby to spare her pain. For, though one certainly wants a 
friend or lover to be faithful, one would rather know him to be 
unfaithful, if he is, and forgive him if one can, than live in a 
fraudulent relationship. 
But what about (possible) lies to Harold Macmillan, instead of 
to Khrushchev? to George Catlett Marshall instead of to Mrs. 
Eisenhower? In such cases the behaviors have both public and private 
features, and since some people selectively attend to the private 
aspects of roles and others emphasize the public aspects, they will 
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reach different conclusions about whether Eisenhower ought not to have 
lied to Macmillan and Marshall. Some of those who approve a lie to 
Khrushchev will disallow a lie to Macmillan, recalling that Eisenhower 
and Macmillan were longtime friends; others will regard this 
relationship as irrelevant in view of the fact that Eisenhower was now 
president and Macmillan was now prime minister. Some will weigh 
heavily, and others will minimize, the fact that Marshall had been 
Eisenhower's mentor in the army. 
That is to say, some people assimilate the Macmillan and the 
Marshall cases toward the Mamie case. Others assimilate the Marshall 
and Macmillan cases to the Khrushchev case. On the assumption that in 
recent years there has been a considerable shift in perspective toward 
the private role. it seems likely that lies to Macmillan or Marshall 
would be more widely criticized today than they would have been in the 
Eisenhower era. Such a shift would correspond to the shift in 
·perspective (already noted), as a result of which marriages that Jane 
Austen and Trollope praised as "sound" are. more often than not, 
condemned today as "commercial." 
As a final example of the way in which differential attitudes 
toward public and private roles can affect the assessment of behavior 
in certain roles consider the acrimonious disagreement a few years ago 
between trustees and students l6 over colleges' and universities' 
investments in companies doing business in South Africa. Most 
trustees. interpreting their role as a public one, regarded it as their 
duty to maximize investment return for the institution for which they 
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were responsible. As individuals, they were of course entitled to sell 
such holdings in their personal portfolios if they wished to show their 
disapproval of the South African government. But as trustees it would 
be wrong to allow "sentiment" (as they might have put it) or moral 
indignation to affect their investment policy. So long as they 
maximized return within the limits of the prudent-man rule they were 
doing their whole duty as trustees. 
To their student critics the matter looked very different. 
They ignored the distinction, fundamental to trustees, between public 
and private roles, and in effect demanded that trustees behave, as 
trustees, in ways appropriate only in very private roles. They wanted 
the trustees' investment policy to express love for the abused Blacks, 
in much the same way that we want the behavior of a husband to his wife 
to express his feelings for her. Hence when trustees pointed out that 
their holdings were too small for sales to affect the policy of the 
South African government, students were quite unmoved. They did not 
recommend divestiture as a rational policy calculated to achieve such-
and-such results; they demanded it as an end in itself. Given such 
differences in perspective it is not surprising that trustees and their 
critics failed to understand each other. 
As a result of this tendency to assimilate public roles to 
private roles, performance in many roles -- Begin in the West Bank, for 
instance, Thatcher in the South Atlantic, Nancy Reagan in the White 
House -- that is viewed as praiseworthy by the role players themselves 
and by much of the population, is condemned by many others as 
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incompetent or worse, because performance fails to correspond to their 
view of the role as a private role. Of course perspectival differences 
over the nature of roles are by no means the sole cause of varying 
assessments of some individual's performance in some particular role 
Begin's policy could be regarded as counter-productive, Thatcher's as 
too risky, Nancy Reagan's as bad public relations for reasons having 
nothing to do with the public/private distinction. Nevertheless, 
differences in perspectives on roles can be a complicating factor that 
makes agreement even more difficult than it otherwise would be. 
That is the modest, but not unimportant, thesis of this essay. 
I have argued, first, that there are fundamental differences between 
public and private roles; second, that the criteria appropriate for 
evaluating role performance vary depending on whether a role is public 
or private; hence, third, that people who differ about whether a role 
is public or private will evaluate the very same performance very 
differently. It would be naive to hope that this analysis, by 
explaining why people disagree, will eliminate their disagreements. 
But it may at least show disputants what they are arguing about. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. An example is a possibly apocryphal dean of Balliol College, Oxford, 
in the years just after World War I, who is said to have enlivened 
long winter evenings by leading a coterie of undergraduates friends 
in raids on the rooms of other undergraduates whom he and they 
disliked; on mornings after these forays he would summon the 
offenders to his office and fine them heavily for having damaged 
college property. Everyone will surely agree that this dean had 
an astonishing capacity for confusing social roles. As dean 
performing in a public role -- he should not have incited 
undergraduates; as friend, he might. As friend -- performing in a 
private role -- he should not have fined undergraduates; as dean 
he must. 
2. Eth. Nic. 1156a 6, ff. 
3. In The Dean's December Saul Bellow exactly characterizes 
Aristotle's friendships of utility: " ••• love [was] simply an 
investment that looked good for the moment. Today you bought 
Xerox. Next month, if it didn't work out, you sold it" (p. 289). 
The contrasting requirements for an Aristotelian friendship of the 
good were set out by Ford Madox Ford: "One's friends must accept 
one's actions and divine the justification for those actions--or 
one must do without friends!" (quoted in Frank MacShane, Ford 
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Madox Ford [1965] p. 138). 
4. In an important essay, "Ruthlessness in Public Life" (Moral 
Questions, pp. 75-90), Thomas Nagel has distinguished between what 
he calls "concern with what will happen" and "concern with what 
one is doing." As I see it, the latter sort of concern is 
predominant in private roles, the former in public roles. 
5. So, too, Lear. When Goneril and Regan argue that the costs to 
them of maintaining the knights attendant on the king greatly 
exceed the benefits to him, he replies, "0 reason not the need" 
(II, iv, 267). 
6. K. Vorlander, Immanuel Kant (Meiner, Leipzig, 1924), 2:331. 
7. The terminology is w. D. Ross's (in The Right and the Good). 
8. See below, pp. 33-34. 
9. ~, 7:8-20, 24. 
10. The Ecclesiastical History of Ordericus VitaliSt Book VII (ed. and 
trans. by Marjorie Chibnal, 6 vols., Oxford, 1969-1980), vol. IV, 
pp. 86-88. lowe this example to John Ft Benton. See his as yet 
unpublished paper, '~ritten Records and the Development of 
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Systematic Feudal Relations," pp. 6-7. It is interesting to note 
that Duke William apparently agreed with Roger's assessment of the 
relative importance of his two roles. Though William at first 
banished Roger from Normandy. he called Roger's treatment of Ralph 
"handsome and proper," and restored Roger's honors. 
11. The Claverings, Ch. xxii. 
12. ~,vol. III, ch. vii. 
13. Mr. Justice Bazelon's address at the 1981 annual meeting of the 
American Psychological Association is a good example of the way a 
modulation can start. Relying on his long experience hearing 
cases in which psychological "experts" testify, the judge 
discussed what he called the "sins" of the profession: a tendency 
to make "conclusory pronouncements," a failure to "expose the 
facts under their conclusions" and "the values underlying their 
choice of facts," and a failure to "come clean on the 
uncertainties of opinion that may exist. " . . . The fact that 
extensive excerpts from the address were printed in the 
APA Monitor, (vol. 12, no. 10) shows that this modulation is 
beginning to spread, though it is far from clear that it will 
eventually take on. 
14. Eth. Nic., 1109a 26-27, 1l09b 22-23. 
15. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1982. The Times' 
editorial writers thought that Stimpson lived in a "quaint," but 
"better," world than ours. 
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16. I use the term "student" as a convenient shorthand to refer to the 
whole group of which students probably form the majority but which 
also includes many faculty members and some trustees. Similarly, 
as regards the term "trustee," 
